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An "Objectively Reasonable" Criticism of the Doctrine 
of Qualified Immunity in Excessive Force Cases Brought 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In Graham v. Connor, the United States Supreme Court announced 
for the first time that "all claims that law enforcement officers have used 
excessive force ... in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 
'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth 
Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard."1 In other words, "the 
question is whether the officers' actions [were] 'objectively reasonable' 
in light of the facts and circumstances confronting thcm."2 Application of 
the "objectively reasonable" standard in the context of excessive force 
cases ought to be rather straightforward; after all, the standard is 
fundamental to the American legal system. For example, in tort law, 
juries arc routinely asked to place themselves in the shoes of medical 
doctors, lawyers, and other professionals in an effort to determine what 
conduct is objectively reasonable under a given set of facts. 3 Likewise, in 
criminal law, where a defendant raises self-defense in response to a 
charge of murder or battery, juries must determine whether the force 
used was objectively reasonable in response to the perceived threat.4 The 
inquiry is often fact intensive, and like all questions of fact, should be 
entrusted to the jury. 5 
As this paper seeks to explain however, in excessive force cases 
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,6 the role of juries has been essentially 
usurped by the doctrine of qualified immunity, such that judges are 
deciding what is reasonable and enabling law enforcement officers to 
escape liability through ambiguities in the law. The Supreme Court's 
I. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 ( 1989) (emphasis omitted). 
2. !d. at 397. 
3. See, e.g., Knowlton v. Deseret Med., Inc., 930 F.2d 116, 121-22 (I st Cir. 1991 ). 
4. See, e.g., Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 396 (3d Cir. 20 I 0). 
5. Randall H. Warner, All Mixed Up About Mixed Questions, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 
I 0 I. I 04 (2005). 
6. 42 L.:.S.C. 9 1983 (20 I 0) states: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom. or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress 
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attempt at harmonizing the doctrine of qualified immunity with its 
holding in Graham has only caused greater confusion, and the only 
solution appears to be eliminating qualified immunity from excessive 
force cases altogether. 
II. THE DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials 
from civil damages under 42 UOSOC. ~ 19830 Its primary purpose is to 
allow for the dismissal of a lawsuit at the summary judgment stage, such 
that government officials in the course of performing their discretionary 
functions arc not burdened by the costs of litigation or distracted from 
their governmental duticso 7 The leading case is liar/ow vo Fitzgerald, 
where the Supreme Court formulated the rule that "government officials 
[arc entitled to qualified immunity] insofar as their conduct docs not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have knowno"x What a "reasonable person 
would have known" is clearly a question of fact; however, the Supreme 
Court has turned the entire qualified immunity analysis into a question of 
law~dccidcd by judgcso9 The Court did this by not focusing on the 
"reasonable person" aspect of the rule announced in Harlow, but rather, 
on the "clearly established 0 0 0 rights" aspcct. 10 The Court instructed 
judges to determine whether there was a clearly established law, 11 at the 
time the alleged civil rights violation took place, that forbade the 
official's conduct. 12 If no such law existed, the official would be 
presumed to have acted reasonably since the conduct at issue had not 
been "previously identified as [being] unlawful." 1.1 On the other hand, if 
there was a clearly established law, the official would not be entitled to 
qualified immunity because "a reasonably competent public official 
should know the law governing his conduct." 14 
7. Harlow v. Fit:rgcrald, 457 U.S. XOO, X 15 19 ( 19X2). 
X. /J. at X I X (emphasis added). 
9. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 52X (19X5). 
I 0. Sec Harlow, 457 U.S. at X I X. 
II. Harlow intended for qualified immunity to hinge entirely on the existence of clearly 
established law. !d. Yet, it is striking that nowhere in the opinion docs the Court define what a 
clearly established law is. Subsequent cases have held that at a minimum, Supreme Court decisions 
and decisions from the circuit where the case arose arc considered clearly established law. MICIIAII 
L. WI'I.I.S LT AL., CASLS ANIJ MATioRIAI.S 0:\ FLIJI·.RAI. COURTS hi (2007). The amount of "tctual 
similarity needed f{.lf a case to be clearly established law is discussed later in this paper. See infi'a 
part VI. 
12. Harlow, 457 U.S. at X I X. 
13. !d. 
14. !d. at XIX 19. 
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Ill. EXCESSIVE FLAWS 
Harlow essentially allowed judges to determine the "objective 
reasonableness of an official's conduct" solely "by reference to clearly 
established Jaw." 15 According to the Court, approaching qualified 
immunity in this manner would allow for many lawsuits to be dismissed 
on summary judgment, thus avoiding the need for trial. 16 Ironically 
however, Harlow was not decided on summary judgment-the qualified 
immunity issue was remanded back to the trial court. 17 The Court 
reasoned, "The trial court ... is better situated to make any such further 
findings as may be necessary." 1R This exposed a flaw in Harlow: If the 
primary purpose of qualified immunity is to allow for the dismissal of a 
lawsuit at the summary judgment stage, a single dispute concerning a 
material issue of fact will preclude summary judgment. 19 For example, 
imagine a situation where a suspect is shot multiple times by a law 
enforcement officer during the course of an arrest. In a subsequent civil 
rights lawsuit, the suspect claims that he submitted to the arrest and did 
nothing to provoke the officer's attack. The officer however, claims that 
he feared for his life because the suspect reached for something in his 
pocket despite being told to put his hands up. In a situation such as this, 
where a government official is entitled to qualified immunity under one 
set of facts, but not the other, summary judgment would be precluded 
until the disputed facts are resolved by a jury?0 Once a jury is summoned 
however, the purposes of qualified immunity announced in Harlow-to 
prevent government officials from being burdened by the costs of 
litigation or distracted from their governmental duties-are largely 
diminished, if not lost entirely. At this point, the officer would likely 
need to go through witness testimony and evidence production, which 
can be costly and time consuming. Moreover, particularly in excessive 
force cases, another potential problem arises. 
If a jury is summoned to resolve disputed facts for the purpose of 
qualified immunity, the jury will also be asked, in the interest of judicial 
economy, to resolve facts that go towards the merits of the excessive 
force claim.21 That is, whether under Graham, the officer's usc of force 
was objectively reasonable. This places the jury in an exceptional 
15. !d. at 81 ~-
16. !d. 
17. !d. at X 19-20. 
IS. !d. at R20 (emphasis added). 
19. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 56; Katz v. United States, 194 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 1999), overruled by 
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (200 I) (overruled on other grounds). 
20. Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2004). 
21. See Anderson v. Russell, 247 F.3d 125 (4th Cir. 2001); Willingham v. Loughnan, 261 
F.3d I 17R (11th Cir. 2001 ). 
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position. On one hand, the jury is resolving facts for the judge to 
determine whether the force used was objectively reasonable-by 
reference to clearly established law-under Harlow, and on the other 
hand, the jury is resolving facts for itself to determine whether the force 
used was objectively reasonable under Graham and the Fourth 
Amendment. The result can be problematic. Recall the example used 
above where a suspect is shot multiple times during the course of an 
arrest. Imagine that after the facts arc resolved by a jury, the judge 
detem1incs that there is no clearly established law prohibiting the 
officer's conduct, and therefore, the officer is presumed to have acted 
reasonably and is entitled to qualified immunity. Imagine also however, 
that although there was no clearly established law, the jury found that the 
officer's usc of force was completely unreasonable under Graham. In a 
situation such as this, should the officer be allowed to escape liability 
because there was no clearly established law, when a jury found that the 
amount of force used was objectively unreasonable? In other words, 
"[ c ]an there be a reasonable usc of unreasonable forcc?" 22 
Apparently so. In fact, the example used above where a suspect is 
shot multiple times during the course of an arrest is taken from an actual 
case-Anderson v. Russel/. 21 In Anderson, the suspect was walking 
around a shopping mall with headphones on and a portable Walkman 
radio tucked in his back pockct. 24 Another mall patron mistakenly 
believed the Walkman radio to be a handgun and notified a nearby law 
enforcement officer.25 The officer observed the suspect and determined 
that the hard object in his back pocket (the Walkman radio) resembled 
the shape of a handgun. 26 Thus, the officer followed the suspect outside, 
drew his firearm, and instructed the suspect to get on his knees and put 
his hands up. 27 The suspect complied with the order, but then reached to 
tum off his Walkman radio whereupon the officer began firing. 2x The 
suspect suffered permanent injuries to his arm and leg and brought a civil 
rights lawsuit in the District of Maryland. 29 The facts were heavily 
disputed, which caused the district court to summon a jury.'0 On the 
excessive force claim, the jury unanimously found that the ofticer's usc 
of force was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and rendered a 
22. Erwin Chcmcrinsky & Karen M. Blum. Fourth Amendment Stops, ,1rrcs/s and Searches 
in the Con/ex/ of Qualified lmmunill\ 25 TOliRO L. KJV. 7X I, 7X2 (2009). 
23. Anderson v. Russell, 247 F.3d 125 (4th Cir. 200 I). 
24. !d. at 127 2X. 
25. !d. at 12X. 
26. !d. 
27. !d. 
2X. !d. 
29. !d. 
30. ld at 12X 29. 
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verdict m favor of the suspect.31 On the officer's claim for qualified 
immunity however, the judge held that the officer's usc of force 
complied with his training, 32 and there was no clearly established law 
prohibiting the officer's conduct. 33 Therefore, the officer was granted 
qualified immunity and judgment as a matter of law, notwithstanding the 
jury's verdict. 34 
Allowing a judge's presumption of reasonableness-based solely on 
the presence or absence of clearly established law-to trump a jury's 
finding of unreasonableness runs counter to the "bedrock principle" that 
"questions of fact are best determined by a jury."35 As one 
commentator/judge explains, "[J]uries arc in the best position to discern 
the truth, having heard testimony first-hand along with all the eye-
twitches, sweaty brows, pregnant pauses and other non-verbal cues that 
accompany it."36 Cases like Anderson seem to ignore this importance-
but courts do not have a choice. It used to be that many circuit courts 
refused to follow Harlow in excessive force cases to avoid a result like 
Anderson.37 For instance, in a landmark case called Saucier v. Katz, the 
Ninth Circuit denied a police officer's claim for qualified immunity 
based on the premise that the rules announced in Harlow and Graham 
both sought to determine the reasonableness of an officer's conduct. 3x If 
material facts were in dispute, the question of reasonableness should go 
to the jury.39 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that "an officer cannot have an 
objectively reasonable belief that the force used was necessary (entitling 
the officer to qualified immunity) when no reasonable officer could have 
believed that the force used was necessary (establishing a Fourth 
Amendment violation)."40 As convincing as this sounds, the Supreme 
Court reversed 9-0.41 
31. !d. at 128. 
32. /d. at 129. 
33. Sec id. at 129. The absence of clearly established law can only be assumed because 
otherwise, the officer would not have been entitled to qualified immunity even if the officer had 
complied with his training. For another case where jury and judge come out opposite, see 
Willingham v. Loughnan, 261 F.3d 117X (lith Cir. 2001 ). 
34. Anderson, 247 F.3d at 128. 
35. Warner, supra note 5, at 104. 
36. !d. 
37. Katz v. United States, 194 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir. 1999) (listing cases); Dunigan v. 
Noble, 390 F.3d 4X6, 491 n.5 (6th Cir. 2004) ('"Prior to Saucier, a majority of Circuits, including our 
own, held the question of whether an officer was entitled to qualified immunity from an excessive 
force claim was identical to the inquiry on the merits of the claim."). 
38. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (overruling Katz v. United States, 194 F.3d at 968 
(9th Cir. 1999)). 
39. See Katz, 194 F.3d at 970 n.5. 
40. /d. at 969 (9th Cir. 1999). 
41. Saucier. 533 U.S. 194 (200 I) (overruling Katz on other grounds). 
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IV. HOLDING ON TO QU/\LIFIED IMMUNITY IN 
EXCESSIVE FORCE C/\SES 
[Volume 26 
The Court held that the qualified immunity analysis was "not 
susceptible of fusion" with the merits of an excessive force claim, and 
the two should not be "treated as one question, to be decided by the 
[jury ]."42 It offered two main rationales. First, the Court focused on the 
purposes of qualified immunity that were originally announced in 
Harlow: "The approach the [Ninth Circuit] adopted-to deny summary 
judgment any time a material issue of fact remains on the excessive force 
claim-could undermine the goal of qualified immunity to 'avoid 
excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many 
insubstantial claims on summary judgmcnt."'41 Needless to say, this 
rationale is unpersuasivc and symptomatic of this paper's earlier 
criticism of Harlow. If a material issue of fact remains, summary 
judgment is necessarily precluded; there would be no effect on the 
resolution of "insubstantial claims" because insubstantial claims arc 
those where an officer would be entitled to qualified immunity even if all 
the evidence was viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.44 
There would be no material issues of fact remaining, and thus, the Ninth 
Circuit's approach would not even apply. Furthermore, if summary 
judgment is precluded, the "disruption of government" would be 
substantially the same whether the jury was resolving facts for the 
purpose of qualified immunity or for the merits of the excessive force 
claim. The officer would have to go through the same stages of litigation, 
particularly witness testimony and evidence production. The Court was 
incorrect to assume that the Ninth Circuit's approach would have any 
significant impact on the purposes of qualified immunity. 
The second rationale offered by the Court focused on the dangers 
and dynamics of law enforcement. According to the Court, there is a 
fundamental distinction between the protections afforded to law 
enforcement officers under Graham as compared to under Harlow. 4' 
Graham recognized that "police officers arc often forced to make split-
second judgments-in circumstances that arc tense, uncertain, and 
rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a 
particular situation."4(' Thus, m a world of "limitless factual 
42. !d. at 197. 
43. !d. at202 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. XOO. XIX ( I9X2)) 
44. S!'c Harlow. 457 U.S. at X 16 19. 
45. Sa11cicr. S:\3 U.S. at 204. 
46. !d. at 205 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting (iraham v. Connor. 490 U.S. 3Xh. 397 
( 19X9)). 
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circumstanccs,"47 the Court argued that Graham is meant to protect 
officers from reasonable mistakes in fact. 48 For instance, if an officer 
mistakenly believes that a suspect is carrying a gun, and that mistake is 
reasonable, the officer would be protected under Graham for using more 
force than was actually neccssary.49 Harlow on the other hand, is 
purportedly meant to protect officers from reasonable mistakes in the 
law. 5° The Court explained: 
The qualified immunity inquiry ... acknowledge[s] that reasonable 
mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular police 
conduct. It is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the 
relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual 
situation the officer confronts. An officer might correctly perceive all 
o{the relevant/acts but have a mistaken understanding as to whether a 
particular amount of force is legal in those circumstances. If the 
officer's mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable [by reference 
to clearly established law], however, the officer is entitled to the 
. . d £' 51 tmmumty e1ense.-
In other words, law enforcement officers are given two bites at the apple. 
If an officer correctly perceives all of the relevant facts, but uses more 
force than is necessary, the officer escapes liability unless a clearly 
established law declared that the amount of force used was illegal under 
those circumstances. This is notwithstanding the fact that no reasonable 
officer would have acted similarly. The tension is obvious. Furthermore, 
if the plaintiff only needs to show a clearly established law, then 
theoretically Graham and the Fourth Amendment should apply because, 
even if Graham is intended to protect officers from reasonable mistakes 
in fact, it is clearly established law that using more force than is 
"objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances" is 
illcgal.52 But the Court rejected this argument, stating that "the right the 
official is alleged to have violated must have been 'clearly established' in 
a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense .... [It] must be 
defined at the appropriate level of specificity [to be] clearly 
cstablishcd."53 
47. !d. at 205. 
48. !d. at 204-05_ 
49. ld at 205. 
50. !d. 
51. fd_ (emphasis added). 
52. Sec Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (internal quotations omitted)_ 
53. fd_ at 202 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 ( 1987) and Wilson v_ Layne. 526 U.S_ 603, 615 ( 1999)). 
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V. NO SPECIFICITY ON THE "APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF SPECIFICITY" 
Apart from the concerns that (I) the Court is affording law 
enforcement officers too much protection from liability and (2) the Court 
is splitting hairs to distinguish Graham's fact-based protection from 
Harlow's law-based protection, 54 this paper's main criticism of Saucier 
is that the Court offered no clear guidance concerning the "appropriate 
level of specificity" needed for a law to be clearly established. 
Subsequent cases have only made it less clear. For instance, in f!ope v. 
Pelzer, a prisoner brought a civil rights lawsuit against three prison 
guards for cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 55 
After getting into a fight with one of the guards, the prisoner was chained 
to a hitching post at both arms. 5r' The guards removed the prisoner's shirt 
and let him bake under the sun for seven hours. 57 He was given no 
bathroom breaks, only two drinks of water, and was taunted by the 
guards throughout the ordeal. 5x The Eleventh Circuit held that although 
the prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights were clearly violated, the guards 
were entitled to qualified immunity because the law concerning the usc 
of the hitching post was not clearly established. 59 Although it could be 
"inferred" from "analogous" case law that the guards' conduct was 
illegal,60 the Eleventh Circuit held that the case law needed to have 
"materially similar" facts in order to be considered clearly established 
law.61 In other words, to overcome qualified immunity, the prisoner 
would have had to cite case law that prohibited a prison guard from 
chaining a prisoner to a hitching post for seven hours, without a shirt, 
without bathroom breaks, without water, and while taunting him. 62 This 
was how many circuit courts interpreted Saucier,rll but the Supreme 
Court rejected such a narrow approach.M 
The Court adopted a "fair warning" standard in Hope, and held that 
prior case law did not need to have materially similar f~1cts to serve as the 
basis for clearly established law.1' 5 In fact, no factual similarity was 
54. For an argument that Saucier and its distinction between 0mham and Harlo\\' is really a 
case about judicial activism, see John C Jeffries. Jr.. What·, Wrong H'ilh \_)uo/ijied /mmunitl·. 62 
FtA L, Rt'V. X 51. R61 6 7 (20 I 0). 
55. Hope v. Pelzer. 536 U.S. 730. 7.\3 (2002). 
56. /d. 
57. M 
5X. ld at 735. 
59. Hope v. Pelzer. 240 F.3d 975. 9X I (lith Cir. 200 I). 1n· 'd, 536 US 730 (2002). 
60. ld 
61 IJ. (quoting Suissa v. Fulton County. Ga .. 74 F.3d 266. 269 70 (lith Cir. 19'!6)). 
62. Si'i'id. 
63. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY. FFDERAL JURIS!lllTION 552 (Wolters Kluwer eel.. 5th cd. 2007). 
64. Hopi!, 536 U.S. 730. 
65. /d. at 741. 
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needed at all-"officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates 
[clearly] established law even in novel factual circumstances."66 As long 
as the current "state of the law" gave the officer "fair warning" that the 
conduct was unlawful, the officer was not entitled to qualified 
immunity.67 This holding greatly relaxed the standard that was 
purportedly announced in Saucier, making it "much easier for civil rights 
plaintiffs" to overcome qualified immunity.68 Up until the time Hope was 
decided, cases were routinely being dismissed due to the lack of 
materially similar cascs.m Though Hope was an Eighth Amendment case 
and not a Fourth Amendment case, one would expect Hope to apply fully 
to excessive force cases; after all, cruel and unusual punishment is not 
too far removed from the use of excessive force. 70 Interestingly however, 
in the only excessive force case to be heard since Hope where clearly 
established was at issue, the Court seemed to completely ignore Hope. 
VI. A LESS THAN OBVIOUS RETREAT FROM HOPE 
In Brosseau v. Haugen, the Court retreated from Hope and granted a 
law enforcement officer qualified immunity due to the lack of materially 
similar cases. 71 In Brosseau, a suspect ran from law enforcement officers 
and jumped into his car. 72 He locked the doors and while fumbling for 
the keys, a police officer drew his gun and ordered him to get out. 73 The 
officer banged on the driver side window until it shattered, but by then, 
the suspect had started the car and began driving away. 74 The officer 
jumped back and shot the suspect in the back.75 The Ninth Circuit, 
relying on Hope, denied the officer qualified immunity on the grounds 
that the officer had "fair warning" that using deadly force under the 
circumstances was unlawful.76 The Supreme Court however, in a per 
curiam opinion, reversed 8-1 without even hearing oral argument-the 
case was decided solely based on the petition and opposition for 
certiorari.77 In its opinion, the Court held that the officer was entitled to 
qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established in the 
66. /d. 
67. !d. 
6S. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 63, at 552. 
69. See id. at 554. 
70. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. I (1992). 
71. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004). 
72. !d. at 196. 
73. !d. 
74. !d. 
75. !d. at 196 97. 
76. Haugen v. Brosseau, 339 F.3d S57, S73 74 (9th Cir. 2003). 
77. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 63, at 554. 
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"more 'particularized' sense" under Saucier.n The Court stressed the 
lack of a materially similar case, and in a single sentence, distinguished 
Hope on the grounds that Hope was "an obvious case" where materially 
similar cases were not needed because it was obvious that the conduct at 
issue violated clearly established law. 7 ~ Apparently, the constitutionality 
of shooting an unanncd suspect in the back while that person is driving 
away is "far from ... obvious."xo Needless to say, Brosseau's departure 
from Hope and back towards Saucier has caused "great confusion in the 
lower courts as to whether and when cases on point arc needed to 
overcome qualified immunity.x 1 
VII. ANAL TERN!\ TIVE APPROACH 
In light of the confusion after Saucier, Hope, and Brosseau, the 
Court should consider reformulating the doctrine of qualified immunity, 
at least in the context of excessive force cases. The Ninth Circuit's 
approach in Saucier was persuasive-recognizing that Harlow and 
Graham are substantially the same inquiry and denying qualified 
immunity in favor of the jury deciding the question of reasonableness. 
Apparently however, the Supreme Court felt that this approach did not 
provide law enforcement officers with sufficient protection for 
reasonable mistakes. One explanation could be that the Court is wary of 
juries having to apply a constitutional standard on a consistent basis. xc If 
that is the case, the following approach could be a reasonable alternative 
to qualified immunity in excessive force cases. 
A better approach might be to eliminate qualified immunity 
altogether in excessive force cases; but rather than create a whole new 
test, the Court should remove the question of reasonableness from the 
jury and allow judges to decide whether the usc of force was objectively 
reasonable. Under this approach, jury interaction would remain much the 
same, except that after all the facts arc resolved, the judge would decide 
the ultimate constitutional question of reasonableness based on the jury's 
findings. While this would be a departure from settled practice, it appears 
to have an adequate basis in the law. For instance, trial court judges 
already decide the question of reasonableness on motions for summary 
judgment whenever facts arc undisputed or viewed in the light most 
n. Brosseau. 543 U.S. at 199 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194.202 (2001 )). 
79. !d. at 199. 
RO. Si'e iJ. 
X I. CIIFMERINSKY, supra note 63, at 555. 
X2. Sec Anton in Scalia. Thi! Rule of Law as a /.a\\' ojRu!l!s, 56 U. Clll. L. RI'V 1175, II X I 
X2 (I 'JX9) (recognizing that the Court sometimes docs not trust juries with questions concerning 
constitutional standards). 
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favorable to the plaintiff.x3 Moreover, appellate judges routinely decide 
the question of reasonableness every time an excessive force case goes 
on appcal. 84 Judges arc well-equipped, yet it seems odd that the 
constitutional question of reasonableness only goes to the judge when 
facts are not in dispute, but at all other times, is entrusted to the jury. It 
would perhaps make better sense to have the jury resolve the facts, and 
have the judge decide the question of reasonableness based on those 
facts. 
There arc several benefits to this approach. First, it would eliminate 
the need for line drawing between Hope and Brosseau, and courts would 
not have to worry about clearly established law. Second, the Court could 
retreat from its "irreducibly murky"85 distinction between Graham and 
Harlow. If applied judiciously, Graham alone provides law enforcement 
officers with adequate protection for reasonable mistakes. Third, even 
though they would be denied qualified immunity, law enforcement 
officers would benefit by having judges decide the constitutional 
question of reasonableness. Judges arc in a better position to decide 
constitutional questions, having been trained in the law and having 
developed expertise through experience. This approach would also 
eliminate potential jury bias. While jury bias can cut both ways,86 
consider the case of Jared Massey, a YouTubc sensation and public hero 
after being Tasered by a Utah Highway Patrol officer in 2007. 87 Despite 
an internal investigation clearing the officer, the state settled for $40,000 
rather than risk a jury awarding more. 88 Fourth, the approach would serve 
the same purposes as qualified immunity by allowing claims to be 
decided early on summary judgment. If no material issues of fact remain 
in an excessive force case, instead of looking to sec whether there is a 
clearly established law, the judge would simply decide the case. This 
would not be an unprecedented expansion of judicial power; as 
mentioned above, our legal system already allows judges to do this in a 
variety of circumstances. Lastly, the approach would keep judges honest 
by holding them to the Fourth Amendment standard. Granted there is still 
flexibility for judges to decide cases based on their own personal 
83. Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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ideologies, but the amount of discretion is far less than what the current 
doctrine of qualified immunity allows.x~ 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the doctrine of qualified immunity is incompatible 
with excessive force cases. Both qualified immunity and the Fourth 
Amendment constitutional standard focus on reasonableness, and the 
Supreme Court's attempts to distinguish the two have made qualified 
immunity cases ncar impossible to predict. Under Brosseau, a plaintiff 
will be hard-pressed to find case law that is materially similar in a world 
of "limitless factual circumstanccs."90 Under Hope, law enforcement 
officers arguably have fair warning of everything. The difficulty is 
fashioning a rule that balances these two extremes, something the 
Supreme Court has not been able to do. Asking whether the 
constitutional violation is "obvious," as suggested in Brosseau, is no 
more helpful than asking whether the constitutional violation is clearly 
established. The reality that it is possible for law enforcement officers to 
"reasonably act unreasonably" is evidence that the doctrine of qualified 
immunity needs to be eliminated from excessive force cases, or the 
Supreme Court needs to fashion a whole new test. 
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